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ETHICAL CONS IDERATIONS FOR THE CORPORATE LEGAL COUNSEL 
Thomas B. Metzloff 
Duke Univer sity School of Law 
The Amer ican Bar Foundat i on's most recent statistical Profile 
of the United sta t e s Lega l Prof ession demonstrates the significance 
of in-house cor porate counse l within the legal profession . At 
present, a full 10 % o f t he attorneys are employed in private 
industry, total l ing over 55 , 000 attorneys. About half of these 
attorneys (or approximat e ly 25 , 000) were employed by either Fortune 
500 firms or firms in the top 50 in various industry categories. 
32% of the attorneys in private industry worked in companies with 
a legal staff of over 50 . 
Yet, these numbers do not capture the true nature of the 
e volution. In a ddition to just numbers, the quality of the work 
be ing performed has undergone a significant change. Before, the 
paradigm was one of r~utine--- in-house counse~ did the ~ork th~t 
the law firm lawyers dldn't want to do. Certalnly that plcture 1S 
no longer corr ect . More and more sUbstantive work---including 
Ii tigation--- is being performed by the corporation's own attorneys. 
What then should be said a bout the ethical dimension to this 
evolving sector of the practice? To begin our understanding of 
this topic, a few obser vations about the nature of the work is in 
order. All a r e e xpress ed in terms of what corporate counsel are 
not---thus emphasizing the difference with the law firm a ttorney. 
1-- The Lawyer as Non-Independent Contractor. The attorney is more 
clearly employed by the client- entity (who is signing his check) 
than is the lawyer in a firm who at least functionally works for 
the firm who in turn is working for the client-entity. Whether 
this makes any different is a difficult question, but the 
difference in form is at least potentially significant. 
2---The Non-Transaction Nature of the Representation. The in-house 
attorney's work is not usually compensated on a per hour basis or 
even on a per task basis. This is perhaps the clearest 
manifestation of a fundamentally different model of representation. 
A corporate law department is not a profit center as is a private 
law firm. Indeed, one rather cyn i cal business manager referred to 
his company's legal staff as "the Department of Prof it Prevention." 
Law firms have a market-driven check on their performance---how 
much money are clients paying us each year over and above any 
malpractice liabil~ty :that we have? Given the lack of paying work, 
it becomes more dlfflcult to assess in a tangible manner "how 
things are going . " 
3---The Importance of Non-Legal Advice. The work to be performed 
tends to be more prospective a s planning is often involved. 
Perhaps the best short-hand description is that an in-house 
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attorney's job is to facilitate the business side's work. As such, 
the line between the attorney's legal role and non-legal "business" 
issues is less distinct than in law firm practice. Thus as Eve 
. Spangler has recently remarked in her book on "Lawyers for Hire," 
the lawyer's involvement in clearing a business deal "shades by 
imperceptible degrees into availability as a sounding board for the 
business person's ideas .. " 
4---The Non-firm structure. The organization of the corporate law 
department is not nearly as uniform as the partner/associate 
structure of the law firm. centralization and "lines of command" 
vary according to the industry and dictates of the individual 
general counsel. Opportun i ties for "promotion" organized 
differently as there is less of a sense of up or out. Prospects 
for getting what my law firm's partners called "the big bucks" are 
probably less. other differences in the hiring/firing/paying 
system exist such as non-lawyer review and lateral entry into the 
business side of the same corporation. 
Given the above factors, how then do we beg in to fit th i 5 
segment of the legal profession into the legal ethics frameworks 
developed over the years? Regrettably, one does not find much help 
in the formal legal codes. Putting the ethical issue in hi stor ical 
focus in terms of formal "ethical codes" does not take much time at 
all--there simply is not much to talk about. All the professi onal 
codes through to the early 1970s basically assumed a mode l of an 
attorney in a private law firm who primarily handled lit iga tion. 
This ethical system had two major attributes. First, the e thical 
rules presupposed that there was a process by which an attorney was 
retained by a client to perform a given service. Many corol laries 
flowed from this seemingly straightforward proposition: (1) there 
was a need for clients to obtain information about the unive rse of 
attorneys and select one; (2) the question of fees needed to be 
resolved; (3) the attorney had leeway whether to accept or reject 
~he representation; (4) attorneys would have many clients ; (5 ) 
lssues relating to termination must be addressed; (6) the codes 
must also deal with representing conflicting interests. 
Second, the ethical codes established loyalty to the client as 
the primary attribute of the profession . At the same time , the 
codes could pay lip service to public interest by defin i ng the 
public interest as being a "zealous advocate" for your client since 
from the battle of advocates "truth" would emerge. The advocacy 
model seems to presuppose litigation as the only role to be played 
by lawyers. Within this model, at least the facade of independence 
w~s maintained. A lawyer could go full out on your clients behalf 
wlthout buying into their values. After all, you had many clients, 
and by speaking for one, you were not speaking for the others or 
yourself . 
. There is just one problem--this model has next to nothing to 
do Wlth most corporate counsel's legal professionalism. The one-
on-one advocacy model simply does not work for a large number of 
lawyers. As stated by Geoffrey Hazard, "For the lawyer retained by 
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an organization such as a corporation ... , identifying the client 
is much more complicated. Client identity is ambiguous, 
continuously problematic, and requires resolution by conscious 
choice." Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978) The old 
Codes then gave worse than no guidance. Rather, they assumed that 
most of the "representational" problems were resolved at the 
beg inning of the representation. Who was paying the bill was 
generally the ~lient---that pers~n is embraced in a close 
relationship, wh1le everyone else 1S put at an arms' length or 
fur ther. Yet, as Hazard remarked, "in the real world, the identity 
of the client may not be established until after some critical 
decisions have to b~ made, and may never be unambiguously 
established at all." Id. 
And what then of those "client-like" non-clients? It happens 
all the time---the estate lawyer dealing with a family yet writing 
the will for one spouse. Yet, our rules talk about clients as if 
they are to be held and cherished like your mother in old age, and 
"non-clients" who should be viewed with skepticism and at least 
occasionally loathing. "When the prospective primary client is 
uncertain how to define his own relationship to the other person in 
the transaction, the lawyer's position is inevitably tentative and 
ambiguous. " Id. See generally Jonas, Who is the Client?: The 
Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 Hastings L. J. 617 (1988); McCall, 
The corporation as Client: Problems, Perspectives, and Partial 
Solutions, 39 Hastings L. J. 623 (1988). 
The key problem of corporate legal ethics revolves rather 
tightly around the question "who is the client" for the corporate 
c ounsel. What's fair to say is this---we began this decade with a 
ve ry poor conception of the corporate counsel's ethical role. We 
a re now experimenting with a new effort at definition as defined by 
Rul e 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This 
provision of the Model Rules went through several drafts during an 
i ntensely political debate ove~ its provisions. See Riger, The 
Model Rules and Corporate Pract~ce: New Ethics for a Competitive 
Era, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 729 (1985). As the corporate counsel 
profession comes of age, we can expect further change and 
evolution. Serious criticism of the new approach detailed in Model 
Rule 1.13 have been raised. See Mitchell, Professional 
Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic 
Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466 (1989). 
saying someone is your client is really a shorthand expression 
that you are operating ~n the behalf of someone or something else 
as opposed to your own 1nterests. In a sense, this characteristic 
is captured by the notion of loyalty, which in many respects is 
fundamental. As a second attribute, there is a strong notion that 
this loyalty characteristic is meant to operate to the exclusion of 
a similar loyalty interest to a sometimes poorly defined group of 
other interests. This notion is captured by the concept of 
"conflict of interest." 
The basic problems of determining representation in the 
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corporate context are explored in Problem One which is attached. 
In reading through the problems, consider whether the corporate 
counsel acted properly in dealing with the company's President who 
was being forced out of the company by other shareholders. The 
facts are based upon the recent decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 
536 N.E.2d 344 (1989) (reversing $500,000 judgment against attorney 
who played role similar to that of the corporate attorneys in the 
problem. 
When everything is working right in a company, the business 
managers view the law department as "part of the team, not 
intruders to be viewed with suspicion." This view causes many 
commentators great concern. These lawyers cannot be "trusted ll to 
protect the private interest---they are too loyal. There is no 
sense of independence, or separa·tion. That presents two important 
questions: Is "independence" an important professional virtue for 
lawyers, and, if so, is there something about the nature of the in-
house attorney's work that makes it largely unattainable? See 
generally Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 Boston U. L. Rev. 
1 (1988). Consider the following quote from one law firm partner: 
It is not uncommon for us to tell the president that he's a 
turkey. You know: "You're a damn fool, and you've got an 
environmental problem right now and you've got to spend a 
million dollars to fix it even though it will lose you money 
this year, or you're going to go to jail. That's the magnitude 
of your problem. I'd like to hear an in-house lawyer say that 
to a president who just had a stockholders' meeting where he's 
promised the world. I'd like to see an in-house lawyer tell his 
board of directors that his president is violating the Foreign 
Corporate Practices Act. The fact is, there's just no room for 
wilful blindness at that level. If you have both loyalties and 
accountability to the superior, you can't be independent ... 
What this quote exhibits is a serious criticism about the 
"overloyalty" of in-house corporate attorneys, and somewhat clear 
suggestions that the law firm attorney---with the added separation 
that the firm structure gives him---is somehow "more ethical." Nor 
is the point made only by law firm attorneys: The literature in 
this field has a number of quotes from general counsels to the 
following effect: "I always feel I have one hat, and this is: I 
am a corporate office who happens to be a lawyer." The argument 
can be recast in a slightly altered form as follows: In the 
business world, the lawyer's ethic of risk prevention will 
inalterably be in conflict with the entrepreneurial ethic of ri sk 
taking. 
At first blush, the concern being expressed here is troubling. 
All professionals are supposed to be "independent" aren't they? 
Yet, the legal profession has never really been very serious about 
independence as a professional norm, especially when measured 
alongside loyalty. Unlike the accounting profession, lawyers have 
done little to insure a meaningful sense of independence. Indeed, 
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the attorney-client relationship is in some respects the antithesis 
of the CPA role. The lawyers' job is not typically conceptualized 
as that of a "public watchdog", but rather as a facilitator of the 
client's objectives. Constraints on advocacy or the limitations on 
assisting the client often come from non-ethical considerations. 
How then do we measure this corporate lawyer's contribution in 
ethical terms? The ethical justification for the increase in in-
house counseling must be found, if it is to be found anywhere, is 
the Model Rule's reorientation towards competence. See Model Rule 
1.1. The true measure of the in-house then becomes the in-house 
attorney's relative competence on the key issues versus the firm 
lawyer's competence. Is the nature of the in-house practice likely 
to result in greater competence? This is the type of quest ion 
which the legal profession is not very good about asking, much less 
answering. Maybe each has some advantages---greater breadth of 
experience in the outside firm which may be useful in some 
situations. But the key issue is competence, and in this context, 
my guess is that it relates to two additional critical concerns not 
often discussed in an ethics course: specialization and cost. 
Loyalty has never been penalized for being too muc h in 
abundance. Yet, it does create some problems in the corporate 
context. The strength of the loyalty runs to many potentially 
different clients. Yet, this is not unique to in-house attorneys. 
The real question is what happens when the interests are in 
conflict. The diff icul ty of answering the question "who is the 
client" is in a sense a shorthand for a very different, and 
ultimately more important question: "How are we going to handle 
conflicts of interest in this context?" 
The primary conflict of interest rule (Model Rule 1.7) works 
better when you're an attorney considering whether to take on a 
client in the relative quiet of your office. The Rules want you to 
investigate the new client and see if his/her or its interests are 
adverse to somebody you are already representing. If its a group 
of people who are hiring counsel, the Rules want you to analyze 
whether you can do the job for everybody. This is well and good, 
but does it help in-house corporate attorneys? Consider the usual 
scenario -- We already know we've got the one "big" client---the 
company. We are not considering whether to "add" that client to an 
existing portfolio. All of a sudden some issue comes along, and 
someone with a legitimate claim to the loyalty of the company (to 
whom we owe loyalty both individually and professionally through 
the derivative relationship with the corporate client). That 
person asks us, the company's lawyers, for help. What do you do? 
If your omniscient, you can look into the crystal ball and see 
where the matter will eventually lead. Is this really a~y 
different than the private lawyer? The private practice lawyer ln 
uncertain cases has a rather useful tool to help him or her decide-
--ask the existing client. No conflict rule can ever be precise 
enough to tell you what to do. By definition, the inquiry is 
subjective and speculative. The rules try to put order onto chaos, 
/ 
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and malpractice rules, disciplinary rules, and the like are making 
this pressure even greater . The corporate representation situation 
is perhaps the most amorphous of al l. These are people seeking 
help who have a legitimate moral claim to assistance or at least 
explanation . They are acting on behalf of the company. Is there 
a way to conduct· an analysis? This is clearly an emerging area of 
law that is far from settled. The potential for major ethical 
mistakes exist and will become even more serious as corporate 
counsel go further into litigation acti vi ties. See Reycraft I 
Conflicts of Interest and Effecti ve Representation: The Dilemma of 
Corporate Counsel, 39 Hastings L. J . 605 (1988 ). 
There is a clear need for educating those around you about the 
nature of the corporate representation. Lawyers often do not 
understand that it is primarily their responsibility to clarify the 
relationship. Developing a good understanding requires a 
sensitivity to conceptualizing the problem as one of multiple 
representation as opposed to a pure conflict. For example, 
consider a sex discrimination suit against a company supervisor 
wi th both the company and the supervisor named as defendants. When 
the claim is initially made (assume its before a lawsuit is even 
filed) I it looks like the claim is lacking in merit, although maybe 
not frivolous. You hate to go out and hire a separate attorney for 
both the company and the supervisor. So you use the legal staff t o 
"represent" both. Can you even do this? Almost clearly yes if you 
satisfy the basic Model Rule 1.7 construction, i.e. (1) the lawyer 
does not believe that it is directly adverse; and (2) consent of 
both clients after consultation. The possibility exists for a 
potential disaster. The supervisor is found individually liable 
for something under some state law theory. The supervisor may well 
seek to assert a malpractice based upon a conflict of interest. 
How can this be avoided? Always having separate counsel is 
expensive. Can the company even pay for separate counsel? The 
answer here is yes. See Comment, Rule 1.7: "So, also, when a 
corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a 
controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the 
corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of 
the directors or employees, if the clients consent after 
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyers' professional 
independence." It is thus essential that an attorney (1) recognize 
the potential concern; (2) make a formal analysis under Rule 1.7 
that your judgment is that one lawyer can represent both ; and (3) 
make disclosures so that individual's client's judgment is 
exercised based upon good information. Some attorneys go further 
and obtain independent counsel to analyze the Rule 1.7 question. 
Basic problems with the role of corporation counsel are 
evident from a number of judicial decisions drawn from a variety o f 
contexts. For example, in the area of wrongful d ischarge, courts 
have taken a basic view that in-house attorneys are essentially 
similar to outside counsel so that the "client"--the corporation--
has the ability to fire counsel with or without cause. Thus, most 
courts have held that in-house counsel have no claim for wrongful 
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d ischarge. See willy v. Coastal, 64 7 F.Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986); 
b ter v . North American Company, 150 Ill. App.3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 
Her 5(19 86) A recent decision from the Illinois Court of Appeal 343. ' " t ' ts that there mayan exceptlon ln those Clrcums ances ln 
sugges , f' 1 1 1 See wh i c h the corporate attorney lS per ormlng a non- ega ro e. __ _ 
Balla v. Bambro, Inc . , 1990 Ill. App . LEXIS 1376 (Sept. 10, 1990). 
This line of decisions s~ggests that courts have s~me 
ling e ring uncertainty ~nd, confuslon abo u t the natur~ of the 1~­
house counse l 's role wlthln ~h~ company. Court remaln uncerta~n 
about such issues as the abl1 l ty of In-house counsel to obtaln 
other jobs in the mar~etplace, their ability to "blow t~e whist~e" 
'''' i thout suffer ing ser 10US adverse consequences. For an lnterestlng 
a nalysis of the wrongful discharge cases as well as other cases 
fr om other contexts in which courts have analyzed the roles played 
by c orporate counsel, s ee Schneyer, Professionalism and Pui?lic 
Pol icy: The Case o f House Counsel , 2 Georgetown J. Legal EthlCS, 
449 (1988). 
A final, and critical issue, relates to corporate counsel's 
duties of confident iality. In o rder to focus the discussion, a 
hypothetical problem is attached . This problem presents a number 
of ethical issues faced by an attorney representing a corporation. 
The earlier Codes (i.e. the Canons of Professional Ethics and the 
Hodel Code of Professional Responsibility) did not deal very 
clearly with attorneys representing entities as opposed to 
individuals. The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules), on the other hand, make a significant attempt to focus the 
a ttorney's ethical respon~ibilities when representing an entity. 
See Model Rule 1.1,3., ,Tt;ls ~elatively new attempt to define the 
attorney's responslbllltles lS of great significance and indeed 
may be the most important substantive addition brought about by th~ 
Model Rules. 
As you read through the problem, consider the following 
questions: 
( 1) Who do you represent? 
The ~odel Rules prov,ide ~n Model Rule 1.13 that an attorney 
representlng ~n organl~atlon llke a corporation represents not the 
i ndi viduals lnvol ved ln that ,organization but the organIZation 
i tself. Thus, throughout the dlS~Ussion with Mr. Treasurer, Connor 
was acting as the attorney fO,r F,lr,stData, not the attorney for Mr. 
Treasurer or Mr. McEnroe as lndlvlduals. 
(2) Can Connor can assist Treasurer R. MCEnroe? 
We must reference Model Rule 1.13 as a starting point and 
then proceed from the re., ,A pr';ldent attorney faced with' this 
i nformation, should at a mlnlmum flrst advise Mr. Treasurer that he 
i s the attorney for the corporation. Rul e 1.13, however, does not 
proscribe an attorney for a corporation representing an officer 
individually. Rather, Rule 1.13(e) references Rule 1.7 concerning 
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t is 
repr
7
senting conflicting interests . While a contrary argu~7~n in 
posslble, Rule 1.7 would seem to preclude joint representa lclude 
this case. It is doubtful that an attorney could con, marY 
representing Mr. Treasurer would not "adversely affect" the prl 
representation. 
(3) What actions do you take? 
Rule 1.13 creates a rich array of factors for the corporate 
attorney to consider including: 
( ) 
th violation 
, a. The seriousness and conse uences of e ,the ~~volved. Are the violations here criminal acts? What '~ved? 
lkely effect on the company of disclosure? How much is invo bl~ 
Does it r 11 ", ' that unten
a 
" ea y put the corporatlon' s posltlon ln, ' ' ation 
posltlc:>n. Has the practice stopped? What is the 11kely lltlg 
scenarlOS and outcomes? 
, IS it 
(b). The scope of the attorney's representatl0n. ;~ not i~ur position to. comment? sometimes , the matter involved >~tent 
e l~wyers' buslness. This provides outside counsel. The e s to 
to WhlCh the attorney has the ability influence, and resource , 
"get to the bottom of the problem" o~ "to take it to the top" lS 
relevant to the ethical analysis. An outside counsel who, has han~17d a traffic case last year simplY isn't going, to be :~h: 
posltlon to command much respect when the he takes the lss
ue 
t 
Board of Directors. corporate counsel almost inevitably are is 
such a position. 
(c) . The res onsibilit in the or anization and tt:
e 
apparent motivation of the "guilty" parties. This factors lS _ _ _ _ 'r us
supposed to be getting at some notion of personal galn ve 
o mo lves for bad actions. "go d" t' 
(d) . The olicies of the or anization 
problems. What does the company say it should do in 
A few basic observations are warranted. At a minimum, the 
attorney should not get involved in the fraud. More fundamentally I ~he a,ttorney should insist that any fraudulent practices s~op 
lmmedlately. The ethical codes have always drawn a clear 11ne 
between past acts and future acts. 
,Wit~out defining an answer as to hoW Rule 1.13 shou~d ~e 
applled ln this case it is clear that t he Rule 1.13 analYS1S 1S 
far more lik~ly to re~ult in the inside lawyer having an ob~igati on 
to do somethlng than it is for the outside attorney. cons1der the 
following points. 
,The in-house counsel will seldom have a "know nothing I see 
nothlng, do nothing" argument as is provided to outside lawyers ~nder the "scope and nature of the representation" argument. The ~n-house counsel is dead solid on the bulls-eye when it comes to 
lnvolvement with the company. 
1 
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The in-house counsel is likely to have superior information 
(both in terms of the c ompany ' s "r~les" for r:andling proble ms both 
formal and informal, and respect1ng the llkely consequences of 
disclosure) than the outside counsel. The in-house counsel wil l be 
less likely to fool himself into thinking this is a minor problem. 
Thus the same problem will in my vie w be perceived as a more seri~us problem with more negative effects by an in-house attorney 
than by regular outside counsel. 
This superior knowledge will effect all the factors set forth 
above, and tend towards the need to do more. 
Rule 1.13 sets forth a precise, a nd relatively clear approach 
that the attorney is required to take. The limited disclosure 
requirements under Rule 1.13(b) are triggered when a lawyer knows 
that an officer of the corporation is engaged in action that (1) 
violates the law and (2) which "is like l y to result in sUbstantial 
harm" to the company . Both conditions would appear to be met in 
this case. Once the attorney concludes that there is a serious 
violation likely to result in substantial harm to the corporation, 
Model Rule 1.13 requires that the attorney "shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization." 
While there are certainly some potentia l ambiguities in this 
formulation, it is crystal clear t hat the relevant focus is on the 
c ompany and not t hat of the individuals. Often this requires 
referring the matter to the corporation's Board of Directors for 
action. If no sUfficient response is ach ieved, the attorney's 
ultimate choice is resignation . See Hemmer, Resignation of 
Cor porate Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty, 39 Hastings 
L. J . 641 (1988). 
(4). Can you keep that conversation conf idential? 
As you think about how to respond , consider who it is tha t can 
waive the privilege relating to the conversation. Pre-QP.john, the 
quest~on would have sparked a debat~. After Upjohn, there is no 
quest10n that the attorney is work1ng only for the corporation. 
There is also no question that Connor's conversation with Treasurer 
is protected by the attorney-client privilege based upon the 
client-attorney relationship between Connors and FirstData. The 
issue then arises as to who can waive that privilege? This 
que~t~on is ,obv~ously of critical , i~portance to Treasurer who has 
exh1~1 ted h1S 1nterest in mainta1n1ng ,c omplete conf identia 1 i ty. 
The 1mportant point to recognize here 1S that despite hi s clear 
in~e~est ~n confidentiality, the applicable attorney-client 
pr 1 v1lege 1S not subj ect to his co~t~ol. FirstData, or indeed 
others, may decide t.o waive the pr1v1lege which will result in 
making co~nors obligated to respond, if ~ubpoenaed, to discuss the 
conversat10n. In a sense , this observat1on merely underscores the 
central theme of the entire problem that Connors is the attorney 
for the r0rr0r~~;0n, and not for individual. 
The potential complications relating to waiver are well 
demonstrated in Commodity Futures Tradinq Commission v. Weintraub, 
120 
1 
became 
oration federal 
a corp fter a d for d't Futures, A f' le 471 U.S. 343 (1984). In Commo ~ y, est~ation. it ~ rustee. 
the target of a federal government ~nv companY', ted a '1' d itS 
, t the o~n 'nue 
agency filed a complaint aga~ns tally apP contl. ttorneY 
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court eve~ Ugovernment anY' s ~ruptcY· 
Despite the bankruptcy, the federa d the cOmPthe ban laiming 
investigation, and eventually subpoenae d ~ to tions c 
seeking information on events the occurr~anti ve queS 
The attorney refused to answer any subs panY'S 
the attorney-client privilege. , the c om
re 
the 
to Yla~",:,e Befo tor of 
The government then asked the Trus;;e~stee dl.d ·nd direc '1'his 
attorney-client privilege, which the ~ officer \vileqeb ruled attorney could testify, however, a for:m~ain the pr rt \Vhl.Cfore ~ 
the company told that attorney to ma~n reme cou d there Yler to 
issue eventually worked itself to the SU~anY' s an d the P~ee had 
that the privilege was only that of the, CO~ightS' h~he '1'rus ver the 
Trustee, who succeeded to the company s h ld that even 0 
waive the privilege. The Supreme co~rt erivilege 
the power to waive the attorney-cl~ent p 'f he 
Objection of the former officers. er (even c~h as 
sur 'g SU hat '1'rea eedl.n 'vilege , 
Thus, in this case, it seems clear ~ some proc the pr~ d Ylaive 
should someday want Connors to testify ~n t Ylaive t coul 
to prove his lack of malicious intent), cann ? _interes 
but that FirstData itself or its successo~-~~ions. 
the privilege even over M~Officer's obJec 
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DISCUSSION PROBLEM 1 
Christie curta in Co. was founded in 1925 by Charles Christie. 
The old corporation, whose primary business was manufacturing 
c urtains, had as its principal customer Sears, Roebuck & Co. while 
o r ig inally a fami ly business, Christie curtain had grown so that 
t here were both family members and non-fami ly members active in all 
l evels of management. 
Thomas Shelton, was hired as christie Curtain's general 
c ounsel in 198 3. Prior to that time, Shelton had been at the law 
fi rm of pickens & Dooley, where he had worked on a number of 
~atters for Christie curtain. The work performed had been wide 
ra nging, and included individual representation of some of the 
members of the christie family in a variety of areas such as estate 
planning. ~elevant to this probl~m, Shelto~ had drafted a will for 
J oel Christle, the youngest son ln the famlly, 
In mid-1989, Charles Christie asked Shelton to investigate the 
poss ibility of a major corporate reorganization of Christie 
c ur t a in, in part motivated by his own estate planning needs . The 
basic plan called for t h e sale of all the old corporation's assets 
o a n~w corporat ion , Christie I ndustries, which would be owned not 
only by Christie family me mbers but by senior, non-family members 
o f the current management team. 
When this plan was discussed with Sears, Christie's major 
c lient, Sears sought ass urances that Joel Christie, then President 
o f Christie curtains, would not control the new corporation and 
would be placed in a different position in the company owing to 
ong-standing problems between Sears and Joel. Instead, Sears 
wa nted a non- fam ily member, will Washburn, to become president. 
~his demand was acceptable to Charles Christie and other family 
, embers who had more than enough votes to effect this change. At 
the next meeting o f the Board, Washburn was elected President and 
Chief Executive Officer. 
At this point, Joel went to see Shelton to discuss his 
c oncerns with the proposed reorganization plan, which was actively 
being pursued by Shelton and outside counsel retained to draft the 
necessary documents. Joel asked Shelton whether he was going to 
recei ve an employment contract with the new company. Shelton 
ind icated that the question was a reasonable one, but that he was 
not aware,of management's plans. Shelton agreed that he would put 
the questlon of employment contracts for various individuals on the 
ag enda for the next planning meeting. Shelton also gave Joel a 
c opy of a form employment contract fr om another company that he had 
i n h~s files. They also had a general con~ersation about the types 
o f 1 tems that are typically included ,In long-term employment 
c ontracts. Several days later Joel clrculated a memo to the 
o fficers of the corporation with~ copy to Shelton raising a number 
o f concerns with the proposed reorganization. 
122 izati011 , 
the reorgan have 
Prior to the closing with respect to loyees woul<: n ot 
Washburn informed Shelton that none of th~ emp Shelton dl-d 
long-term contracts with the new corporatl-on . 
disclose this information to Joel . , tpe 
89 FollOWl-ngther 
The closing took place on December 30, ~9 . Joel's bro 11g 
closing, Joel owned 22.5% of the new corporatl-~~~ dispersed amo t S 
also owned 22.5% with the rest of the owners l- loyment contrac 
non-family members. The question of l ong- term em-g four r e 
was not raised at the closing. In January, 199h~r controlled mo t O 
non-family members and Joel's brother (wh o to<iJet) asked 5hel ton t e 
than 50% of the shares in the new corporatl-on i natories to vOee 
draft a voting agreement that would requ i re the s o~ted by any t;:-hr 5 ' 
for any candidate for the Board of Directors SUbPt asked the ~l-rmot 
of the signatories. Shelton prepared a draft , U Shelton dl-d n 1 n 
outs ide law firm to consummate the agreementt ' ng agreement. to 
inform Joel or Charles Christie about the vo l-poration vote? on 
February, 1990, the directors of the new co~ to replace hl-m 
terminate Joel's employment with t he c ompany an 
the Board of Directors. 
Joel has filed a legal ma lprac tic e 
complaint against Shelton based upon 
reorganization as described above . 
eth iCs 
t ; on and an t he ac .L , in 
h i s actl-Ons 
I a11d 
, between Joe to 
Was there an attorney-clie n t r e l at i o n shl-P al duties owed d 
Shelton? Has Shelton breached any ethica l or; ~~~entlY if yOU ha 
Joel? What actions would you have t a ken dl-f 
been Shelton? 
DISCUSSION PROBLEM TWO 
, ata, a modest-si ~ed 
George Connors is general counsel to Fl-rstO d data proceSS l-ng 
company involved in selling word processing an years ago after 
systems. Connors came to FirstData about twO ars with a large 
having been in private practice for several Y~porate deals f or 
downtown law firm. He had worked on several , cOed the people an 
FirstData when he was with the firm. He enJoYhis liking, so he 
thought the opportunities there were more to I when it presented 
accepted an offer to become their general counse 
itself. 
's comptroller, has 
This morning, John Treasurer, Firstoat;:-a ediately. conno~s 
called Connors asking if they could meet l-mm, s voice. John l-S 
agreed, but detected a note of concern in John and they wor r 
one of Connors' closest friends at Firstoata, 
together frequently. 
When 
door, and 
financial 
, upset. He shut the 
Treasurer arrl-ved, he was visl-blY t was experiencing 
began by telling George that Firstoa aould lead "to more difficulties which, if not corrected, w 
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ser ious problems." The problem began several years ago when 
FirstData's President and largest stockholder, Mark McEnroe, began 
a series of highly questionable financing arrangements. Like any 
growth company in a high tech field, FirstData had tremendous 
capital needs. Frequently, they would lease a computer system to 
a client on a long-term lease and at the same time enter into a 
financing arrangement with a bank that would loan the money to 
purchase the hardware. The lease payments from the client would 
then be used to service the loan and provide FirstData with a 
profit. 
Mr. Treasurer now disclosed that McEnroe had intentionally 
overstated the value of the computer systems in order to obtain 
larger loans. The excess proceeds from the loans were then used 
for general expansion . At first, the overstatements were modest, 
but have increased over time. ' Several of the initial leasing 
agreements were now expiring. After expiring, many customers would 
return their computer systems, at which time the systems would be 
valued. It seemed quite likely to Mr. Treasurer that once this 
valuation was made, the fraud would be uncovered. He thought that 
perhaps the situation could be handled secretly for a while since 
t~e com~any had adequate cash to keep paying off the loans for the 
tlme belng at least. 
A~ the details were unveiled, it became clear to Mr. Connors 
that hlS old firm had closed many of the loan transactions and may 
wel~ have been negligent in investigating the value of the computer 
equlpment. 
Mr . Treasurer could not specify the total amount of the 
o~er~tated value, but thought perhaps it was as high as $4.5 
m~lllon, but could be lower. He was corning to Mr. Connors at this 
tlme becaUse he was concerned with the effect of the disclosure on 
th~ comp~ny's relationship with its Bank. While McEnroe was the 
prlmar¥ lnstigator of the plan, Treasurer , and others, had known 
about lt and had helped to keep it going. 
Treasur ' h' ~r then asked Connors to adVlse 1m on how to proceed 
to protec~ h~mself McEnroe and FirstData. Treasurer also insists 
that ~he ~nformat{on be ke~t confidential since disclosure would 
certalnly harm th 
e company. 
What can or ? Is he ethically obligated to 
keep the infor t~ust Connors do. confidential, and if so, from 
whom? Is h ,ma ~on he has learned atto~ney-cl' ~s conversation with Treasurer ,protected by the ~ent privileg? If so who can walve the privilege? 
Wha t are Conn e. "th t h' , , 
, 1 d' or's ethical obll'gations glven a lS prlor flrm was 1nvo ve In th t' ns at' ? e past financial transac 10 1ssue. 
